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On 18th April 1980, the new Zimbabwe took its
place among the nations of the world following 90
years of settler-colonial rule and a brief three-
month period of direct British rule. The last eight
years were a period of bitter and escalating war that
threatened the stability of the whole region of
Southern Africa. For Zimbabwe itself, the war left
28,000 dead, .275,000 wounded, 225,000 refugees
living in neighbouring states and some one million
internally displaced persons who had fled the rural
war to seek refuge in the urban areas.
In February 1980, following the most closely
monitored election of modern times and to the
surprise of most observers, Robert Mugabe's
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic
Front) (ZANU/PF) party won 57 out of a possible
80 seats in the 100-seat House of Assemblythe
remaining 20 seats being reserved for the white
minority in accordance with the Independence
Constitution agreed at the Lancaster House confer-
ence in late 1979. Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front
(PF) party, known formally as the Zimbabwe
African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), won 20 seats and
Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council
(UANC) won the remaining three seats. Following
the election results, Mr Nkomo accepted Mr
Mugabe's invitation to join a broadly based
coalition government which also included two
white cabinet ministers, one a minister in Mr Ian
Smith's Rhodesian Front Government, the other
the former leader of the white farmers' union, the
Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU).
Within a few months, minority-ruled Rhodesia had
become majority-ruled Zimbabwe and a war which
had been fought increasingly in adjacent states as
well as inside Zimbabwe had turned to peace. What
many analysts of Southern Africa had thought
impossible had taken place: the installation of a
government in Salisbury composed of the leaders of
nationalist guerrilla movements. There was no
white coup d'etat, no military intervention from
South Africa, no immediate exodus of whites, and
particularly white farmers, from the country and no
reprisals for past hostilities.
The purpose of this article is to outline some of the
major problems facing the new Government of
Zimbabwe. The most immediate social and econo-
mic problems are those resulting directly from the
war. Their solution lies in what the government has
termed the '3Rs': resettlement, rehabilitation and
reconstruction. Of greater medium and longer term
concern are the underlying structural problems of
the economy and the pattern of development which
the new nation inherits. Zimbabwe's past pattern of
development has created major problems in the
critically important areas of access to the means of
production, especially land, to employment, to
basic social services as well as in the distribution of
wealth and income. In a situation not uncharacter-
istic of many less developed countries, but made
worse by decades of racial legislation and practice,
economic growth in Zimbabwe has benefited the
small largely white elite; for the majority of the
blacks it has meant increased poverty.
Mr Mugabe's government has committed itself not
only to addressing the immediate problems
resulting from the war but also to a radical restruc-
turing of the economy in the favour of the black and
increasingly marginalised majority. This latter
objective is to be achieved internally .through the
development of a socialist economythat is, a
change in patterns of production and in the distri-
bution of wealth, income and land. Externally the
strategy will be one of self-reliance, which includes
lessening the economy's dependence on the West in
general and on South Africa in particular, and
strengthening ties with other countries within
Southern Africa committed to 'economic liber-
ation'.1
In attempting to achieve these goals, the govern-
ment is faced with another set of problems. On the
one hand are what the ZANU/PF election mani-
festo called 'the historical, social and other existing
practical realities in Zimbabwe'. These include 'the
capitalist system which cannot be transformed
overnight', the monopoly of high level skills held by
the white minority, the dominance of foreign
capital and the need to maintain and even expand
export production, at least in the short run, in order
to purchase necessary inputs as well as to expand
domestic production. On the other hand are the
demands from the landless, the unemployed, the
The term 'economic liberation' is used by the Front Line
African States members of the Southern African Development
Coordination Committee (SADCC) in their recently adopted
strategy of lessening their dependence upon the Republic of
South Africa and in opposition to the South African initiated
policy of the constellation of states. An overview of the
approach to policy changes likely to be adopted by the new
government of Zimbabwe can be gained from UNCTAD 1980
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low-paid and those without basic social services for
an immediate improvement in their material well-
being.
To move too quickly to change the present order
runs the risk of provoking a flight of necessary
white expertise and capital. This would lead to a
decline in production and foreign exchange
earnings, while increasing the likelihood of a
politico-military response from those whose way of
life is being threatened, especially given the as yet
unsuccessful attempts to integrate the two guerrilla
armies and the army of the former Rhodesian
security forces. To move too slowly runs the risk of
the government losing grass roots support, of accen-
tuating tribal divisions, of driving a wedge between
the present political leadership and the radical
guerrilla armies and, in general, of fuelling the
'crisis of expectations' of the black population in
what is potentially a very volatile situation. It is
within the context of these conflicting pressures
that the serious social and economic problems of
the country will have to be addressed.
Zimbabwe's inherited economic structure is export-
oriented and dependent upon foreign capital and
the plentiful supply of low-paid labour. Economic
policies of successive governments have encouraged
the inflow of foreign investment. This has played a
major role in developing the commercial agri-
cultural, mining and more recently the manu-
facturing and financial sectors of the economy. In
1965, when the Rhodesian Front government
made its unilateral declaration of independence
(UDI) from Britain, exports were valued at 56 per
cent of gross domestic product and imports at 46
per cent; over 68 per cent of net profits accrued to
foreign companies, rising to over 90 per cent in the
mining sector. In spite of sanctions, Zimbabwe was
able to switch export markets, introduce new
products and eventually expand exports. To
preserve scarce foreign exchange, vigorous import-
substitution policies were implemented. The
volume of manufacturing output doubled between
1964 and 1974, the number of products made in the
country increased more than sixfold and manu-
facturing became the leading productive sector of
the economy. Today imports are valued at
22 per cent of GDP. In spite of sanctions, foreign
capital continued to flow into the country, largely
through or from South Africa. The government was
able to raise loan capital in Europe and elsewhere.
Except for the period immediately following UD!,
in 1966 and 1967, Zimbabwe's economy has ex-
perienced high growth rates, averaging over five per
cent a year in real terms between 1954 and 1974.
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This successful overall performance of the
economy, however, conceals major structural
problems which the new government inherits and
which it is committed to address.
Land distribution forms one of the cornerstones
of Zimbabwe's inherited economic structure.
Zimbabwe has a total population ofjust over seven
million. 6.75 mn (96 per cent) are black, 210,000
(3.5 per cent) are classified as European and 24,200
(0.3 per cent) are of racially mixed origin or Asian.
In contrast, of the 82 mn acres of farming land in
the country, 39 mn (47 per cent) have traditionally
been reserved for Europeans and 44 mn (53 per
cent) for blacks. The quality of the farming land is
also distributed unevenly in favour of the
Europeans: 54 per cent of all European land and
only 27 per cent of the black land are suitable for
non-irrigated crop production.2 In 1976, the
European land was occupied by 6,700 farms (some
owned by individuals and some by companies) and
on the black land there were some 675,000 black,
mostly peasant, farmers. Successive governments
promoted commercial agricultural development of
the European land to the absolute and relative
neglect of the black land. This was primarily used
as a source of labour supply for the modern sectors
of the economy. Between 1965 and 1974, the
government spent Z$66 mn on black agriculture
and Z$436 mn on European agriculture; in 1975,
European farmers were able to borrow Z$ 111 mn
(mostly short term credit) while the total credit
granted to black farmers was only ZSl mn.3 As a
result it is not surprising to find that in 1979, out of
total agricultural production of ZS523 mn,
Z$443 mn (84 per cent) originated in the European
sector which was also responsible for over 95 per
cent of all marketed agricultural produce.
But not only are there inequalities in access to land
and in the different levels of production in the
different sub-sectors. More important are the over-
crowding and deterioration of black agricultural
land in contrast with under-utilisation of large
areas of European land and the unprofitability of
many European farms. Under the present system of
mixed (arable and livestock) farming practised in
most of the tribal trust lands (TTLs) which make up
90 per cent of black land, the available agricultural
land could carry between 157,000 and 275,000
family units, enabling them to earn from farming
2 Although recent legislation has removed the racial categor-
isation of ownership and occupation of land in Zimbabwe, the
legal changes have made little practical difference to the distri-
bution of farming land. For a contemporary analysis of dis-
criminatory legislation in Zimbabwe see Government of
Norway and International Labour Organisation 1978.
In June 1980, Z$ I = £0.66 Sterling.
adequate, though low, levels of income given
present levels of capitalisation. By 1965, 50 per
cent of the grazing land in the TTLs was either
overgrazed or completely denuded and there were
359,000 cultivators. Since then, 17 times as much
grazing land has been converted to arable as is con-
sidered ecologically safe, the cattle population has
doubled (although one result of the war has been to
reduce the tribal cattle population by one third) and
the number of cultivators in mid-1980 is estimated
to be about 725,000. Even the former government,
which had been retiscent about revealing the size of
the land problem, recently admitted that there were
about 455,000 too many cultivators in the TTLs
[Ministry of Finance 1979].
The impressive levels of production within
European agriculture hide serious problems of
under-utilisation and unprofitability. Production in
the sub-sector is carried out by settler farmers on
individually-owned farms, by larger settler-farms
registered as companies and by large Zimbabwean
and foreign owned companies. About 70 per cent of
farms are owned by settler farmers; 70 per cent of
farms covering 23 per cent of the European agri-
cultural land contribute about 21 per cent to total
European production. In contrast, some 270 units
contribute 52 per cent of total taxable income paid
by European farms; over 75 per cent of gross profits
of European agriculture originate with foreign com-
panies. Even before the war led to the exodus of
over 1,500 European farmers, large areas of
European land lay unused. By mid-1978, the CFU
estimated that seven million acres lay empty. In
addition, analyses of land use by agricultural
economists within the government and at the
University of Zimbabwe would suggest that nearly
60 per cent of the European farming land is not
being fully utilised. In mid-1978, the CFU admitted
that 2,000 European farmers were technically in-
solvent. In mid-1980 government ministers stated
that nearer to 70 per cent of European farms are un-
profitable and can continue to operate only with
the payment of large subsidies. In recent years the
amount of loan finance granted to European
farmers has increased substantially; between 1973
and 1979 loan finance owed by European farmers
to the Agricultural Finance Corporation doubled to
Z$125 mn; most of this was short-term credit.
These marked differences in land utilisation
between black and European land point to the
immediate need for land redistribution. An
independent study by the German Development
Institute in West Berlin suggests that at least 75 per
cent of European land would be needed to settle the
excess population from the TTLs, while at the
same time maintaining a large-scale commercial
agricultural sector [Waller and Otzen 1977]. Under
the Independence Constitution, if this land were
acquired for resettlement, compensation would
have to be promptly paid to present owners and be
available in foreign exchange. At 1979 land prices,
the total cost of acquiring this land would be about
Z$730 mn. It is clear that the Constitution
considerably restricts the new government's ability
to initiate a comprehensive land reform pro-
gramme, especially as the large amounts of aid
promised at the Lancaster House conference for an
agricultural development fund do not appear forth-
coming.
A second fundamental and related problem facing
the new government is the inability of the economy
as presently structured to provide enough jobs for
the growing black population. Between 1969 and
1975, the economy grew at an annual real rate of
8.9 per cent; there was the most rapid expansion in
employment in the past 20 years with an annual
average increase of 31,000 black jobs in the formal
sectors of the economy. Allowing for retirement,
death and opportunities for selfemployment, a
maximum of 50,000 new jobs were available each
year in this period. In the same period, an annual
average of 170,000 blacks were out of school each
year (that is they either left school or else they were
not in school but reached school leaving age). Even
if only black males were looking for jobs (and in
1974, 14 per cent of the formal black labour force
were women) there was still a shortfall of 10,000jobs a year. Since 1974, with an absolute con-
traction of the economy, the number of blacks in
formal sector employment has fallen by over
50,000. Ten years ago the Zimbabwe Treasury
admitted the insuperable problem of creating
sufficient job opportunities in the money economy
however favourable external conditions become'
[Rogers 1979].
Those fortunate enough to find jobs in formal em-
ployment receive extremely low wages both in
relation to their European counterparts and to
minimum income needs. In 1977, average white
wages were Z55 13 a month, average black wages
Z$49. The gap between household incomes is even
higher than this because of the contribution both of
working European wives and of interest and divi-
dends to European household income.
At the end of May, the new Minister of Labour
announced the introduction of minimum wage
legislation to come into force from Ist July 1980.
From that date, minimum wages for industrial and
commercial workers are to be Z$70 a month (rising
to Z$85 a month in January 1981), for mine
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workers ZS43 a month, which takes account of
wages paid 'in kind', and for agricultural and
domestic workers cash wages of ZS30 a month.
These minimum wage levels will certainly assist the
plight of the low-paid, especially as accompanying
legislation will introduce strict price control on
basic consumer goods. But a number of points need
to be made. First, the minimum wages fall far short
of minimum income requirements as calculated for
the Zimbabwean poverty datum line which in early
1980 was estimated to be Z$125 a month for urban
families of six persons. Second, there has, to date,
been no policy implemented to address the
problems of unemployment. It is estimated that one
in five adult blacks is presently out of work. And
finally, recent evidence shows that employers in a
number of sectors have disregarded minimum wage
obligations; for example a survey by the Minister of
Labour showed that some 90 per cent of employers
were paying less than the minimum four months
after the introduction of a minimum cash wage for
agricultural workers of Z520 a month in January
1980.
Whatever future plans the new government adopts
in pursuing the goal of greater economic self-
reliance, in the short- to medium-term employment
expansion will be critically related to export growth
and capital inflow. Some 50 per cent of Zimbabwe's
export earnings originate in the commercial agri-
cultural sector which accounts for 40 per cent of
total black employment. The mining sector em-
ploys 60,000 people; 90 per cent of the output of
the sector is exported while a range of both capital
and consumer goods from the manufacturing sector
are also exported. After 15 years of economic
sanctions accompanied by rigorous import and
foreign exchange controls there is a great need for
the replacement of capital in all productive sectors
as well as new capital for a number of infra-
structural and transportation projects. Thus foreign
exchange is likely to be a critical constraint in the
choice of economic policy options.
In 1980, it is estimated that the value of visible
imports will double from the 1979 value of
Z$549 mn. The deficit on invisibles is likely to in-
crease to Z$250 mn due to an increased volume of
trade, higher costs for freight and insurance and the
continued need to use South African routes to the
coast, in spite of the gradual switch to Mozambique
ports. In 1979, total merchandise exports were
valued at Z$682 mn. The prospects for an export
boom to pay for the increase in imports are far from
good given the world recession, another drought
following the worst on record in 1978-79 and very
disappointing export earnings for tobacco. Thejump in the gold price has however made
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Zimbabwean gold exports the single largest mineral
foreign exchange earner. Before the most recent rise
in oil prices, Zimbabwe's terms of trade had de-
clined by 36 per cent in a six year period; oil
imports currently account for 28 per cent of the
value of total imports. Optimistic forecasts predict
a current account deficit of at least Z$200 mn in
1980, following a net deficit of Z53 18 mn over the
past five years. Government policy towards foreign
capital is as yet unclear. The prospect for large in-
flows of capital are uncertain, although since inde-
pendence the mining industry in particular has
received sizeable inflows. Over the past two years
there was a net inflow of foreign capital valued at
Z$ 190 mn; but much of this was loan finance used
for direct war payments. Between 1977 and 1979,
there was a net private capital and investment out-
flow of ZS2l4 mn. Although figures of inter-
national caita1 movements since independence are
not yet available, government ministers are gravely
concerned about an even greater outflow (both legal
and illegal) of capital from the country.
Insufficient and unequal access to basic social
services pose further problems for the government.
For those wealthy enough to afford them, there are
contributory pension schemes and health insurance
policies. Outside government services there is no
state pension scheme; totally inadequate social
security provisions exist for the retired and unem-
ployed black population. While the government
has announced plans for free primary schooling
beginning in September and for a free national
health service, comprehensive access to basic social
services must remain more a hope than a reality for
the forseeable future.
By no means unrelated to Zimbabwe's inherited
economic structure and the unequal benefits re-
sulting from growth have been problems related
more directly to the war. One result of the war has
been a five-year economic recession: between 1975
and 1979, GDP fell by over 12 per cent in real
terms and overall employment levels fell by five per
cent. The inability of the regime to pay for the es-
calating war from current revenue led to an
increasing dependence on borrowing, both inter-
nally and externally, the latter consisting largely of
secret debt of at least Z$200 mn owed to South
Africa. In the last financial year, declared
borrowings amounted to Z$279 mn to meet expen-
diture commitments; this year the government is
planning to borrow a further Z$439 mn, over 40
per cent of current expenditure. In 1977, the repay-
ment of loans and interest was costing the regime
Z$126 mn a year; since then, the declared national
debt has increased by nearly 60 per cent to
Z$l,230 mn.
More visibly, the war has resulted in a whole litany
of immediate problems. The most urgent is the
growing shortage of food, especially for the 70 per
cent of the population who live in the TTLs or as
squatters in the urban areas. Pressure on land has
increased the inability of the TTLs to feed their
growing population. Prior to 1965, peasant farmers
were responsible for the production of 70 per cent
of the nation's food requirements; today less than
one-third is produced in the TTLs, clearly indi-
cating the need for increasing food imports into the
TTLs. During the war, the herding of 15 per cent of
the TTL population into barbed-wire encamp-
ments, known as protected villages, together with
harsh curfew regulations, resulted in many peasant
farmers being unable to gain access to their fields.
This, together with the creation of large 'no-go'
areas and the burning of villages and crop storage
facilities, meant that in many areas peasant families
became almost totally dependent upon voluntary
agencies for their food needs. In addition, one third
of the tribal cattle population died during the war.
By January 1980 only 1,500 out of 8,000 cattle dips
in the TTLs were operational; cattle diseases such
as tickborne fever are now commonplace in many
areas.
Until recently, Zimbabwe as a whole has been self-
sufficient in basic foodstuffs; indeed Zimbabwe has
exported maize, for example to Zaire, for a number
of years. This year, however, for the first time
Zimbabwe will experience both a national as well
as local shortages of maize, estimated to be between
90,000 and 250,000 metric tons.4 Part of this turn-
about has been due to two years of serious drought,
while part has been due to the decline in land
planted to maize by commercial farmers, falling by
over 20 per cent from 277,000 hectares in 1973 to
215,000 hectares in 1979-80. Already the govern-
ment has appealed to international agencies such as
the World Food Programme and the European
Community to make up the national shortfall. But
even if this is provided, problems of transportation
and distribution made worse by the war will
remain.
The resettling of hundreds of thousands of refugees
and displaced persons who fled from their homes
during the war years provides another set of im-
mediate problems. It has been estimated that recon-
struction and resettlement, including the rebuilding
of houses, roads, bridges, rural stores etc, will cost
over Z$80 mn immediately. The health services in
In spite of predicted food shortages for late 1980, Zimbabwe
continued to export maize at the Start of the year. In the first two
months of 1980, she exported 24,000 metric tonnes of maize.
Most of this was yellow rather than white maize.
the rural areas were also severely disrupted as a
result of the war; before the war, there was on
average one doctor for every 100,000 people in the
rural areas but when the war ended there were only
five doctors working in rural Zimbabwe and almost
half of the rural hospitals and clinics had been
closed or destroyed. In addition, some 3,000 rural
schools had been closed down, and although by
June 1980 most had been re-opened, about 600
remain closed either because they were destroyed or
because equipment had been burned or stolen.
There is a shortage of skills in nearly every sector of
the economy. The war and uncertainty about the
future have contributed to a growing European
exodus. Educational and employment policies over
the past decade have, until recently, ensured that
Europeans have had a monopoly of the profes-
sional, technical and managerial jobs in the
economy; a loss of Europeans is therefore highly
co-related with a loss of skilled personnel. Between
1976 and 1979, there was a net loss of 41,000
Europeans, some 20 per cent of the present total of
210,000, and the rate of white emigration has in-
creased since independence. In 1979 alone, there
was a net loss of 380 engineers and mechanical
engineering workers, while overal' in the past two
years there was a net loss of 15 per cent of profes-
sional and technical workers throughout the
economy. Some industries have been harder hit
than others, with building particularly affected.
Between 1977 and 1979, there was a net national
loss of nearly 50 per cent of European construction
workers, while between January and October last
year the building industry in Mashonaland and
Manicaland lost 33 per cent of their journeymen.
Although about 6,000 Zimbabweans have been
trained abroad during the UD! period and over
15,000 black Zimbabweans have gained skilled or
semi-skilled training on-the-job, it is apparent that
a further rapid exodus of skilled Europeans would
provide serious problems both for reconstruction
and for future development. Fully aware of these
problems, the government is already engaged in a
comprehensive survey of the skills of all Zim-
babweans at home and abroad, the recruitment
from abroad of certain specialised skills and a drive
to expand technical training in specialised institutes
throughout the country.
Another major difficulty lies in the very process of
implementation. A number of tensions can already
be observed. One concerns the relationship between
the European-dominated civil service and the
government. While in some ministries, new
ministers and civil servants have begun to work
together in harmony, in others, relations appear to
be little short of hostile with ministers attempting
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to implement policies in spite of rather than in co-
operation with their civil servants. Another tension
relates to the as yet rather undefined roles of the
party and the government; in many areas of both
national and local decision-making, the distinction
between party and government is far from clear and
this has caused some hostility from non-party
groups and individuals. A third tension arises
because of overlap between responsibilities of cer-
tain ministries. This results in ambiguity both in
outlining policies and in implementation. Another
tension concerns the speed with which different
parts of the government and state structure are
carrying out policies; in general those at the grass
roots are pressing for immediate change, while
those nearer the centre are proceeding with more
caution. Finally, in the weeks following indepen-
dence, Zimbabwe has been invaded by interna-
tional agencies and non-governmental organisa-
tions. There has been considerable confusion in
government, civil service and donor circles over the
nature of aid and assistance being given and the co-
ordination of assistance.
In the space of a few short months, the PF and
ZANU/PF have moved from being national libera-
tion movements engaged in guerrilla warfare to
being partners in a democratically-elected govern-
ment. The tensions and conflicts within Zimbabwe
today, which may well increase in the months
ahead as the euphoria accompanying the end of
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hostilities and political independence begins to
wane, reflect the struggle which until recently was
being fought almost exclusively on the battlefield.
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